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I. INTRODUCTION
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was the first international
criminal tribunal to have been established by way of a treaty between the
United Nations and one of its Member States.1 The Court’s creation was
consequent upon the request by then President of Sierra Leone, Ahmed Tejan
Kabba, to the United Nations Security Council to help set up a strong and
credible court to prosecute persons alleged to have committed serious
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law during
the course of that country’s eleven-year internal armed conflict from 1991 to
2002.2 President Kabba’s quest for individual criminal accountability in
relation to crimes committed during the brutal civil war between the Sierra
Leone National Army (SLA) and rebels of the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) only came upon the back of failed attempts to negotiate and uphold a
peaceful settlement of the armed conflict. In 1996, the Abidjan Peace Accord,
signed between the Government and the RUF, was violated by the rebel
group a few days after its signing, literally before the ink on the paper it was
written on had dried up. Three years later, in 1999, the Government and the
RUF signed the now historic Lomé Peace Agreement, which, inter alia,
offered “absolute and free pardon and reprieve” (in other words,
“unconditional amnesty”) to all combatants in respect of anything done by

* Senior Legal Officer, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.
1 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 12, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138. The Statute of the
SCSL was annexed to the UN-Sierra-Leone Agreement.
2 Letter dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000).
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them in pursuance of their objectives prior to the signing of the peace
agreement.3
In The Legal Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles
Jalloh undertakes an insightful study of the key legal legacies of the SCSL.
While other studies have, in the past, addressed certain design and/or
institutional features of the Court as well as some of its early jurisprudential
footprint, this book is the first comprehensive study of the entire legal and
jurisprudential record, from the earliest preliminary motions challenging the
establishment and jurisdiction of the court, to the final judgement of the
Appeals Chamber in the case involving the trial, conviction and
imprisonment of the former President of Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor.
The book is a magisterial study of the legal legacy of what the United
Nations Secretary-General has referred to as a “sui generis” court of mixed
subject-matter jurisdiction and composition. The first part of the book reveals
the eventful historical background of the SCSL, including the brutal civil war
that led to the death of tens of thousands of Sierra Leoneans and the
mutilation and maiming of many more; the establishment of the Court
through the ingenious process of a treaty between Sierra Leone and the UN,
rather than a Chapter VII resolution of the UN Security Council reflecting
lessons learned from the funding and operation of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) respectively; the institutional structure of the
court, including its innovative aspects such as a dedicated Defense Office to
inject equality of arms with the Office of the Prosecutor; the Court’s
establishment in the locus criminis (the place the crimes were committed),
and how this had facilitated the work of the Outreach Office, another
unprecedented institutional mechanism to ensure that Sierra Leonean victims
of the war had the opportunity to see justice being done to those who bore
the greatest responsibility for egregious violations of their fundamental
human rights. Also discussed is the hybrid character of the Court in terms of
both its mixed ratione materia (subject matter) jurisdiction combining crimes
under international and domestic law, as well as its mixed composition of
international and Sierra Leonean personnel, including judges. This is
followed by a discussion of the legal import of the term “greatest
responsibility,” the SCSL’s thorny findings relating to the crime of “forced
marriage,” as well as its caselaw on the prohibition of the recruitment of
children under sixteen years of age into the armed forces or the ranks of other

3 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Article IX, U.N. Doc. S/1999/777 (July 7, 1999) [hereinafter
Lomé Peace Agreement]; see also Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. Article 14, S/1996/1034, (Nov. 30,
1996) [hereinafter Abidjan Peace Accord].
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warring parties. The book also discusses the SCSL’s caselaw on the
applicability of immunities to former Heads of State and closes with a chapter
on the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the other
transitional justice mechanism that operated alongside the SCSL. All these
issues are discussed with authority and nuance not only for the situation in
Sierra Leone, but also for their implications for the wider field of public
international and international criminal law.
II. AMNESTIES
The focus of my comment is on Professor Jalloh’s treatment of the issue
of amnesties as contained in a decision of the SCSL Appeals Chamber
delivered in March 2004.4 In a preliminary motion filed by two of the
defendants, Morris Kallon and Brima Kamara, it was argued that the SCSL
lacked jurisdiction to prosecute them because Article IX of the Lomé Peace
Agreement granted an unconditional amnesty and pardon for all acts done by
the parties in pursuance of their war objectives prior to 1999. According to
the defendants, any such prosecution would constitute an abuse of the court’s
process because the Lomé Agreement was a treaty between the RUF and the
Government, which could not be unliterally varied by either party. In the
view of the defendants, by signing up to Article 10 of the SCSL Statute,
which states that the Lomé Amnesty provision did not apply to international
crimes under Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute, the Government was seeking to
unilaterally vary the terms of the treaty with the RUF.
In Chapter 9 of the book, the author commences his analysis of the
Appeal Chamber decision with a clear statement of the sole legal question,
which, in his view, called for the judges’ determination. That question was
whether unconditional grants of amnesties by a government can bar
prosecutions before an independent international criminal court for war
crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law. In answering this question, the Appeals Chamber ruled
that an amnesty granted by the authorities of a state, could not prevent the
prosecution of the defendants for international crimes before an independent
international tribunal. Although the author supports this conclusion of the
Appeals Chamber, this was not without criticism. In his view, the judges’
reasoning was muddled, and strayed into grand questions of international
law, such as the formation of customary international law, universal
jurisdiction, jus cogens and erga omnes obligations. While all these issues
remain interesting from the perspective of general international law, they

4 Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on
Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty (Lomé Amnesty Decision) (Mar. 13, 2004).
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were perhaps not directly relevant to answering the ultimate legal question
that was before the Court. So too was the extended discussion relating to the
legal character of the Lomé Peace Agreement, whether insurgent groups had
treaty-making power, and the legal status of such groups under international
law.
I agree with the author that some of the analysis in the Appeal Chamber
decision was not particularly relevant to the ultimate legal question before it.
However, I would be more sympathetic to the judges. First, it is important to
recall that this was the first time that the SCSL was faced with a challenge to
its jurisdiction on the basis of an unconditional amnesty provision for
international crimes contained in a peace treaty. Second, as the author notes,
the SCSL decision was “among the first” by an international tribunal to
consider this issue. For these reasons, it is perhaps unsurprising that the
judges would explore broader international law questions given the historical
moment they were faced with.
In assessing the legal status of the prohibition against amnesties for
serious international crimes, the Appeals Chamber expressed the view that
there was a crystallizing international norm that a government cannot grant
amnesty for serious crimes under international law. The author criticizes the
Judges’ approach to this question, noting among other things, that judicial
decisions should be based on interpretation of the law as it is, not as it ought
to be. He adds that even if one were to accept that such a norm was emerging,
the judges simply assumed, rather than demonstrated, its emergence by a
thorough examination of state practice and opinio juris. In the end, the author
rather scathingly concluded that the judges:
seemed to go well out of [their] way to pronounce . . . on issues
. . . a bit far removed from the amnesty question. . . . They
navigated their way into the choppy waters of treaty and
customary international law . . . and peremptory norms and
obligations . . . . Oscillating somewhat conveniently between
the law as it is, and the law as it ought to be, the judges reframed
the issues. They were able to simplify the difficult issues before
them . . . .5
From the perspective of the traditional sources of international law, the
author’s contention that judges should interpret and apply the lex lata (the
law as it is), rather than lex ferenda (the law as it ought to be), is unassailable.
So too is the author’s preference for judicial modesty or restraint in the
Appeals Chamber’s framing of the issues before it. However, it does appear
to me from the point of view of norm creation under international law, that
5

(2020).

CHARLES C. JALLOH, THE LEGAL LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 304
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the Judges’ reasoning on this point is attractive for showing that even socalled contextual or crystallizing norms (in other words, norms in the process
of formation), can have influence, including in the context of judicial
decision-making. This is even more significant if one considers that the SCSL
decision has been referred to by other judicial and non-judicial bodies dealing
with the amnesty question.6
Despite his overall critique of the approach and some of the conclusions
of the judges, the author does not hesitate to recognize that, through the Lomé
Amnesty Decision, the SCSL added its voice to the emerging international
practice frowning upon amnesties, and that this was a useful addition to the
normative development of international criminal law. Clearly, as part of the
legal legacy of the SCSL, it can be stated with a fair degree of conviction that
the Appeals Chamber made a positive contribution to the development of
international criminal law in this area by concluding that unconditional
amnesties and pardons constitute sovereign acts of a state under municipal
law, that cannot bar the prosecution of international crimes such as genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of
international law before independent international tribunals such as the
SCSL. Similarly, due to the principle of universal jurisdiction, such
amnesties cannot negate the rights of other states to exercise jurisdiction over
persons alleged to have committed such crimes who are present within their
jurisdiction.
The SCSL decision also highlights the importance of the practice of
international organizations on this issue. The author notes the UN’s stated
understanding of the amnesty provision in the Lomé Peace Agreement as not
applicable to international crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. He
adds that this only reflected the position of the UN Secretary-General as one
organ of the Organization and is not attributable to other Member States of
the UN. While as a formal matter this may be true, it is, however, important
to note that since Lomé, the United Nations has invoked this position in a
large and increasing number of contexts, which have been expressly endorsed
by, or at a minimum, acquiesced to by Member States.7 For this reason, the

6 The Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-0662, Decision on the admissibility
challenge by Dr. Saif Al-Islam Gadaffi pursuant to Articles 17(1) (c), 19 and 20(3) of the Rome Statute,
¶ 61 (Apr. 5, 2019); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Work of the Seventy-First Session, U.N.
Doc. A/74/10, at 96 ¶ 11 (2019).
7 See the following non-exhaustive list of UN Security Council resolutions: S.C. Res. 1314, ¶ 2
(Aug. 11, 2000); S.C. Res. 1315, ¶ 5 (Aug. 14, 2000); S.C. Res. 1325, ¶ 11 (Oct. 31, 2000) (calling for the
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, including those relating to sexual violence, to be
excluded from amnesty provisions); S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 4 (June 19, 2008) (noting that rape and other forms
of sexual violence can constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and constitutive acts of genocide,
and stressing the need to exclude such sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions); S.C. Res. 2106,
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SCSL decision adds to the corpus of international practice on the issue of
amnesties for core international crimes, a practice that continues to gain
influence among States.
The book recognizes the critical policy rationales that sometimes make
the grant of amnesties an inevitable choice for Governments. This is true in
situations of protracted violent conflict where some sort of inducement is the
only realistic option Governments have, to bring an end to “unwinnable”
wars and the human suffering that comes with them. As such, I agree with
the author that it is unwise to completely rule out the relevance or
applicability of amnesties, as a matter of law and policy, from the menu of
options available to States to end conflict, restore peace, and promote
national reconciliation. This much is clear from the frank statement of former
President Kabba before the TRC, in which he did not mince words that the
Lomé Amnesty was a deliberate policy choice of his Government to try to
end the war and bring peace to Sierra Leone. The President was also
unapologetic that, given the exceptional circumstances of the Sierra Leone
situation in the late 1990s, the Lomé Amnesty Provision was envisioned to
apply to both domestic and international crimes, despite the express wishes
and counsel of the international community to the contrary.
In this regard, it is important to note that the United Nations encourages
the use of “carefully crafted amnesties” as a means of restoring peace and
security in post-conflict societies. Similarly, Article 6(5) of Additional
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 supports the grant of the
“broadest possible amnesty” to persons who had participated in an internal
armed conflict or were detained as a result of it. This provision, which is
understood not to apply to war crimes, is yet another demonstration of the
potential usefulness of amnesties as an instrument to restore peace and
reconciliation to war-torn societies.
III. CONCLUSION
This important book presents a critical but fair analysis of the SCSL’s
jurisprudence on amnesties for international crimes such as genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international
law. It contains a clear statement of the contribution of the SCSL to this area
of international criminal law and identifies some of the weaknesses in the
judicial reasoning. It properly situates the value and limits of the practice of
international organizations such as the United Nations as evidence of
¶ 12 (June 24, 2013) (stressing the need to exclude sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions in the
context of conflict resolution processes); S.C. Res. 2098, ¶ 25 (Mar. 28, 2013) (calling for the rejection of
amnesties for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, or gross violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law).
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customary international law and adds clarity to the discourse on the legal
validity of amnesties and pardons within municipal law as opposed to
international law. In the end, it is not hard to predict that this book will
become a leading tome for all academics and practitioners interested in
studying the history and contribution of the SCSL to international criminal
law.

